Shared neurocognitive mechanisms of attenuating self-touch and illusory self-touch by Pyasik, Maria et al.
Received: 26 June 2018; Revised: 16 November 2018; Accepted: 12 January 2019
© The Author(s) 2019. Published by Oxford University Press.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/),
which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
119
Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 2019, 119–127
doi: 10.1093/scan/nsz002
Advance Access Publication Date: 15 January 2019
Original article
Shared neurocognitive mechanisms of attenuating
self-touch and illusory self-touch
Maria Pyasik,1,† Adriana Salatino,1,† Dalila Burin,2 Anna Berti,1,3
Raffaella Ricci,1,3 and Lorenzo Pia 1,3
1SpAtial, Motor and Bodily Awareness Research Group, Department of Psychology, University of Turin, Via Po,
14, 10123 Turin, Italy, 2Smart-Aging Research Center, Kawashima Laboratory, Institute of Development, Aging
and Cancer, Tohoku University, 4-1 Seiryocho, Aoba-ku, Sendai 980-8575, Japan, and 3Neuroscience Institute of
Turin, Via Verdi, 8, 10124 Turin, Italy
Correspondence should be addressed to Adriana Salatino, Psychology Department, Via Po, 14, 10123 Turin, Italy. E-mail: adriana.salatino@unito.it.
†These authors contributed equally to the study
Abstract
Despite the fact that any successful achievement of willed actions necessarily entails the sense of body ownership (the
feeling of owning the moving body parts), it is still unclear how this happens. To address this issue at both behavioral and
neural levels, we capitalized on sensory attenuation (SA) phenomenon (a self-generated stimulus is perceived as less
intense than an identical externally generated stimulus). We compared the intensity of somatosensory stimuli produced by
one’s own intended movements and by movements of an embodied fake hand. Then, we investigated if in these two
conditions SA was equally affected by interfering with the activity of the supplementary motor area (SMA; known to be
related to motor intention and SA) using single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation. We showed that ownership of the
fake hand triggered attenuation of somatosensory stimuli generated by its movements that were comparable to the
attenuation of self-generated stimuli. Furthermore, disrupting the SMA eliminated the SA effect regardless of whether it
was triggered by actual participant’s movements or by illusory ownership. Our findings suggest that SA triggered by body
ownership relies, at least in part, on the activation of the same brain structures as SA triggered by motor-related signals.
Key words: body ownership; sense of agency; sensory attenuation; transcranial magnetic stimulation; supplementary
motor area
Introduction
Any successful achievement of goal-directed actions is sub-
served by a perceived causality of the self that is the feeling of
intending and controlling that action in order to influence the
external events. Such experience, known as ‘sense of agency’
(Jeannerod, 2003), is assumed to depend on signals coming from
themotor system (i.e. efferent signals). Specifically,wheneverwe
intend to achieve a willed action, the brain constructs not only a
specific motor program but also predictions of the sensory con-
sequences of the given movement. Then, predicted and actual
action outcomes are compared, and the result of such compar-
ison is fundamental not only for any online motor adjustment
but also for triggering sense of agency. Specifically, the stronger
is the match between predicted and actual consequences, the
stronger is the experience of being the agent (Haggard and
Chambon, 2012; Moore, 2016). It is worth emphasizing, however,
that humans move essentially through their own body (Gallese
and Sinigaglia, 2010). Hence, the body and its physical proper-
ties are crucial for interacting with the external environment
(Georgieff and Jeannerod, 1998). Therefore, a full and coherent
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experience of being an agent is also rooted on an enduring sense
that the moving body belongs to oneself. The feeling of owning
one’s own body, known as ‘body ownership’ (Gallagher, 2000), is
thought to be rooted on the integration of signals coming from
the sensory systems. Specifically, the stronger is the spatiotem-
poral correspondence among the variety of incoming signals
that constantly reach the body (e.g. visual, tactile, proprioceptive,
interoceptive, etc.), the higher is the feeling of own (Botvinick,
2004; Holmes and Spence, 2005; Ehrsson, 2012).
Although these considerations clearly pinpoint that body
ownership must be integrated within any neurocognitive model
of human’s experience of willed actions, existing theories are
rooted almost entirely on a variety of internal efferent signals:
planning, pre-motor processing, efference copy, sensorimotor
predictions and so on (Moore, 2016; Haggard, 2017). Addition-
ally, the very few available attempts to claim that body-related
signals per se can trigger sense of agency have provided only
behavioral evidence. For instance, it has been reported that the
embodiment of someone else’s arm due to brain damage (Pia
et al., 2016) entails also sense of agency over its actions (Garbarini
et al., 2013; Garbarini et al., 2015; Fossataro et al., 2016). The same
happens with an ‘embodied’ real-sized fake hand (Burin et al.,
2017c; Kilteni and Ehrsson, 2017; Burin et al., 2018) or a virtual
avatar (Banakou and Slater, 2014; Kokkinara et al., 2016).
In the present study, we reasoned that if afferent signals
toward the body could induce a sense of agency as the efferent
signals toward the external world did, then both these ‘kinds’ of
sense of agency would depend, at least in part, on the activation
of the same brain structures. In order to test this hypothesis,
here we investigated the impact of an altered body ownership
on sense of agency within a virtual lesion approach. Specifically,
we used the rubber hand illusion (RHI) paradigm to create a
temporary sense of ownership of a fake hand by applying syn-
chronous tactile stimulation to the participant’s own (hidden)
hand and the fake hand (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998). Then, we
used sensory attenuation (SA) paradigm to measure agency. SA
refers to the fact that self-produced stimuli (i.e. stimuli related
to the execution of a voluntary action) are perceived as less
intense in comparison with externally generated stimuli (i.e.
stimuli completely unrelated one’s own action) of the same
intensity (Blakemore et al., 1998, 2002; Burin et al., 2017a). SA is
thought to arise when the sensory consequence of a voluntary
action matches the consequence predicted by an internal for-
ward model and, therefore, is considered to reflect the sense of
agency (Blakemore et al., 1999; Borhani et al., 2017; Burin, et al.,
2017c). We combined the RHI and the SA paradigms in order
to measure the SA of the stimuli produced by an embodied
fake hand and compared it with the SA of the self-generated
stimuli and stimuli produced by a non-embodied fake hand (the
condition that represented externally generated stimuli). Then
we attempted to disrupt the SA of the stimuli generated by
one’s own movements and embodied fake hand’s movements
using single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) over
a brain area known to subserve the intention-programming
system [i.e. the supplementary motor area (SMA; Cunnington
et al., 2002; Carlsen et al., 2015)]. It is worth noticing that motor
intention and motor awareness have been linked also to the
activity of the inferior parietal lobule (Desmurget and Sirigu,
2012), rostral cingulate cortex, superior parietal cortex and insu-
lar cortex (Cunnington et al., 2002). However, here we aimed at
investigating whether agency triggered by body-related afferent
signals and agency triggered by motor-related efferent signals
share some neural signatures, rather than pinpointing all of the
brain structures subserving SA or the sense of agency in general.
For this reason, we capitalized on the only TMS study related
to motor intention/SA, which indeed targeted the SMA (Haggard
and Whitford, 2004).
We predicted that feeling of ownership of the fake hand
would trigger the attenuation of sensory consequences of its
movements that would be comparable to attenuation of self-
generated sensory stimuli and that TMS over the SMA would
similarly disrupt the SA in both conditions.
Methods
Participants
A total of 16 right-handed (Oldfield, 1971) healthy participants
(14 females; age range, 20–37 years) with no previous history
of neurological disease gave written informed consent to par-
ticipate in the study approved by the Bioethical Committee of
the University of Turin. The study was carried out in accor-
dancewith relevant guidelines and regulations for the protection
of human participants. All participants were screened against
inclusion/exclusion criteria for a safety use of TMS (Rossi et al.,
2009).
Procedure
The experiment consisted of two parts in a within-subject
design.
Firstly, we obtained baseline measures of sense of body own-
ership using the RHI paradigm and sense of agency using the SA
paradigm.
Secondly, since we also aimed at measuring sense of agency
over the movements of an embodied fake hand, we merged the
RHI and SA paradigms in a single setup (hereinafter RHI + SA).
It included the SA measurement and, in addition, the mea-
surement of subjective ownership of the fake hand as well
as subjective agency over its movements (by means of ad hoc
questionnaires). For the RHI + SA paradigm, participants were
required to have both baseline effects (i.e. RHI and SA). The initial
testing included 47 participants; 34 participants (81%) had the
RHI effect and 27 participants (64%) had the SA effect. A total
of 20 participants displayed both effects and, therefore, were
selected for the second part of the experiment (4 dropped out
before the second part).
Furthermore, in the SA and RHI + SA paradigms, we used
single-pulse TMS to disrupt the activity of the SMA and exam-
ined how it affected the attenuation of somatosensory stimuli
produced by either one’s own movement or by the movement of
the embodied fake hand.
As a control condition for the TMS, in a different group of
10 participants, we administered the SA paradigm with the TMS
applied over the vertex, a control site that should not be expected
to induce any specific effects (Heinen et al., 2011; Ricci et al., 2012)
(see Supplementary data).
RHI paradigm
The baselinemeasure of body ownershipwas obtained in the RHI
procedure with the vertical setting (Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2012,
2014).
Participants sat in front of a wooden box (40 × 30 × 20 cm)
positioned on a table top. A life-sized model left hand (i.e. a
plastic glove filled with flour) was placed on the upper shelf
of the box, and the participant’s left hand, wearing an identical
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plastic glove,was placed on the lower shelf of the box. The hands
were aligned vertically (20 cm apart) and positioned congruently
with respect to the participant’s shoulder. The space between
participant’s shoulder and the fake wrist was covered by a cloth,
which also covered participant’s real hand, creating the impres-
sion that the fake hand was the participant’s outstretched hand.
Firstly, participants, being blindfolded,were asked to indicate
the perceived position of their left index finger by pointing their
right index finger toward a vertical cardboard attached to the
right side of the box (for six trials). The position marked on
the ruler that was glued to the cardboard was averaged for six
trials and referred to as pre-stimulation proprioceptive judg-
ment. Then, the participants were instructed to alwaysmaintain
their gaze on the index finger of the fake hand and remain still,
while a trained experimenter delivered touches of a paintbrush
to both participant’s and fake hand’s index finger for 2 min.
Therewere two experimental conditions that varied according to
the type of stimulation: the touches were either synchronous or
asynchronous (i.e. the touches to the fake and the real handwere
temporally asynchronous within a random interval of ∼500–
1000 ms). Immediately after the stimulation phase, the partici-
pantswere again blindfolded and asked to indicate the perceived
position of their left index finger on the same cardboard (six
trials, the average was referred to as post-stimulation proprio-
ceptive judgment).
At the end of each condition, participants were asked to
rate their agreement with 6 statements about their experience
of body ownership on a scale from −3 (representing complete
disagreement) to +3 (complete agreement). The questionnaire
included three real statements that described the actual illusory
experience and three control statements (see Supplementary
data); they were selected from a previous study (Botvinick and
Cohen, 1998) and administered in randomized order.
The order of stimulation conditions (synchronous and asyn-
chronous) was counterbalanced between participants.
SA paradigm
In order to obtain the baseline measure of SA, we compared the
subjective judgments of the intensity of somatosensory electri-
cal stimuli, which were delivered to the participant’s right hand
either by the participant’s own button press (executed with their
left hand) or by a button press performed by a non-embodied
fake hand. Single-pulse TMS over the SMA was used to interfere
with the SA effect.
Setup and procedure are summarized in Figure 1A and B.
Here, the participants sat in front of the wooden box (same as in
the RHI paradigm), with the fake hand placed on the upper shelf
of the box and the participant’s hand placed on the lower shelf.
Additionally, they were facing a computer screen, while the TMS
coil was placed on the scalp over their SMA.
TMS pulses were administered through a Magstim Rapid2
stimulator (Magstim, Whitlan, Dyfed, Wales, UK) connected to
a 70 mm figure-of-eight coil positioned over the SMA. The SMA
was localized at 3.3 cm anterior to Cz, according to the 10–20%
system (Arai et al., 2011). Before the experimental sessions, the
coil was positioned over the left motor hotspot to determine the
individual restingmotor threshold (rMT) that was determined as
the lowest stimulus intensity that induced at least three visible
muscle twitches out of six consecutive TMS pulses (Rossi et al.,
2009). Mean rMT was 56.9 (s.d., 7.40; ranging from 42–69%) of
maximum stimulator intensity.
During the experimental session, the stimulation intensity
was set at 100% of the rMT, as in the previous study by Haggard
andWhitford (2004).Within the experimental blocks, some trials
contained ‘effective’ TMS pulses, while others included ‘ineffec-
tive’ TMS pulses (see details below). During the effective TMS
trials, the coil center was placed over the SMA. In the ineffective
TMS trials, the coil was positioned perpendicularly to the scalp
over the SMA. Such position of the coil allows obtaining an
ineffective stimulation while producing cutaneous and acoustic
sensation similar to the effective TMS.
Two buttons were connected to an electrical stimulator (Dig-
itimer DS7A); one was placed under the fake hand’s index finger
and the other one under participant’s left index finger. The
stimulator delivered electrical stimuli (2.5 subjective threshold,
+4 mAwith 300 V voltage) to the lateral digital nerve of the right
hand by means of 5 mm diameter classical bipolar Ag/AgCl sur-
face electrodes. The stimulation intensity was chosen according
to the results of a preliminary experiment that tested the effect
of different intensities (Burin et al., 2017a).
The participants were instructed to maintain their gaze on
a gray fixation cross on the computer screen for the inter-
trial interval (which varied between 9 and 12 s) and wait for
instructions. Then, the fixation cross was replaced with written
instructions (presented for 3 s) to either press a button upon the
subsequent cue (‘When you see the red cross on the screen,press
the button as fast as possible’, i.e. self condition; see Figure 1B)
or to look down at the index finger of the fake hand as it pressed
the button (‘Look at the index finger of the fake hand’, i.e. other
condition; see Figure 1B). In the latter condition, the movement
of the fake hand was executed by a computer-controlled servo-
motor that was installed inside the fake hand at the base of the
index finger. In half of the trials of self condition, a single TMS
pulse was delivered over the SMA (100% of rMT) 10ms before the
cue to move (i.e. self + TMS condition; see Figure 1A). The timing
of the TMS pulse was chosen according to a previous study (Hag-
gard andWhitford, 2004). In order to control for unspecific effects
of TMS, single TMS pulses were also included in the remaining
half of the trials in self condition and in the other condition
(where it was delivered 10 ms before the onset of fake hand’s
movement), but, in these cases, the TMS pulses were ineffective
(i.e. the coil was positioned perpendicularly to the scalp over
the SMA; see Supplementary data for details). In each trial, the
button press produced the somatosensory electrical stimulus to
the participant’s right index finger, and the participants were
required to rate the perceived intensity of the stimulus on a 0–7
Likert scale (0 indicating absence of stimulation and 7 indicating
the highest intensity).
The conditions were administered in a single block with
randomized order of trials; each condition included 20 trials and
4 catch trials (i.e. without electrical stimulation), i.e. 72 trials in
total. The position of the electrodes along the later digital nerve
was changed every 7–10 trials.
RHI + SA paradigm
Here, the RHI and SA paradigms were combined in order to
measure SA of the stimuli produced by an embodied fake hand,
the subjective feeling of ownership of the fake hand and agency
over itsmovements.As in the SA paradigm,we used single-pulse
TMS to interfere with the SMA activity.
Setup and procedure are summarized in Figure 1C and D.The
RHI setting was the same as in the SA condition (however, here
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Fig. 1. Experimental setup: timeline and procedure of a single trial in SA (1A and 1B) and RHI + SA (1C and 1D) paradigms.
participants were not looking at the computer screen), with the
TMS coil placed over the SMA.
The participants were asked to alwaysmaintain their gaze on
the index finger of the fake hand. Then, in each trial, the exper-
imenter synchronously stroked participant’s and fake hand’s
index finger with paintbrushes (as in the RHI paradigm) for
1 min. Immediately after that, the fake hand’s index finger
moved to press the button that delivered a somatosensory elec-
trical stimulus to the participant’s right index finger. Then, the
participants were asked to rate the intensity of the electrical
stimulus on the 0–7 Likert scale (the physical intensity of the
stimuli was the same as in the SA paradigm). In each trial,
a TMS pulse was delivered over the SMA 10 ms before the
onset of the fake hand’s movement. Its intensity was set at
100% of the rMT, and the TMS pulses were either effective
(embodiment+ TMS condition; Figure 1C) or ineffective (embod-
iment condition; Fig. 1C), which was achieved with the same
procedure as in the SA paradigm.
Each condition included 20 trials and 2 catch trials, with both
conditions being presented in a single block with randomized
order of trials (total of 42 trials). The position of the electrodes
along the later digital nerve was changed every 7–10 trials.
Furthermore, each condition included a questionnaire on the
subjective experience of agency. It was administered after one
of the trials of embodiment condition and one of the trials of
embodiment + TMS condition (the trials were selected pseu-
dorandomly from the middle of the experimental block). The
questionnaire included two real statements describing actual
illusory experience of agency and two control statements; they
were selected from a previous study (Kalckert and Ehrsson,
2014) and administered in randomized order (see Supplemen-
tary data). The participants had to rate their agreement with
these statements on the scale from −3 (complete disagreement)
to +3 (complete agreement).
Additionally, to control for the possible effect of TMS on
the embodiment of the fake hand that was induced by the
synchronous stimulation in each trial, two ownership question-
naires were included as separate trials administered pseudo-
randomly around the middle of the experimental block (see
Figure 1D). In these trials, for 1min, the participants experienced
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synchronous tactile stimulation with the paintbrushes; imme-
diately after, a TMS pulse was delivered over the SMA, and then
the questionnaire was administered. The TMS pulse was either
effective (embodiment + TMS condition), or ineffective (embod-
iment condition). The questionnaire consisted of the same 6
statements as in the RHI paradigm, and the participants rated
their agreement with the statements on the same −3 to+3 scale.
Statistical analysis
When at least one variable in each analysis violated the criteria
of normal distribution (Shapiro–Wilk test), non-parametric tests
were used, and when multiple comparisons were present, the P
values were Bonferroni corrected. The effect size was estimated
using dz for parametric tests and r for non-parametric tests.
In the RHI paradigm,pre-proprioceptive judgmentswere sub-
tracted from post-proprioceptive judgments and referred to as
proprioceptive drift (Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005), and the ratings
of real and control statements were averaged. Then, proprio-
ceptive drift and the subjective ratings were compared between
synchronous and asynchronous condition.
In the SA paradigm, stimuli intensity ratings were compared
between self, other and self + TMS conditions.
In the RHI + SA paradigm, stimuli intensity ratings were
firstly compared between embodiment and baseline SA
conditions (self and other) then between embodiment and
embodiment + TMS conditions. Ratings on real and control
statements were averaged both in ownership and in agency
questionnaires. Then, they were compared between embodi-
ment and embodiment + TMS conditions.
Data availability
All data generated or analyzed during this study are included in
this article (see Supplementary data).
Results
RHI paradigm
According to a paired sample t-test, proprioceptive drift in syn-
chronous condition (mean, 3.13 ± 3.00) was significantly higher
than in asynchronous condition (mean, −1.30 ± 2.23; t = 4.32;
df = 15; P < 0.001; dz = 1.64; see Figure 2A). As regards the
ownership questionnaire, Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed
that the ratings in real statements in synchronous condition
(mean, 2.00 ± 1.05) were significantly higher than the ratings in
real statements in asynchronous condition (mean, −1.02 ± 1.78;
z = 3.21; P = 0.001; r = 0.57) and control statements in both
synchronous (mean,−0.08 ± 1.95; z = 2.56; P = 0.005; r = 0.44) and
asynchronous (mean, −1.33 ± 1.66; z = 3.21; P = 0.001; r = 0.57)
conditions. The ratings in real statements in asynchronous con-
dition were not significantly different from the ratings in control
statements in both synchronous (z = 1.47; P = 0.14) and asyn-
chronous (z = 0.31; P = 0.75) conditions (see Figure 2B). These
results show that our sample displayed typical RHI effects in
terms of both proprioceptive drift and subjective experience of
ownership.
SA paradigm
A Friedman’s test for conditions (self, other and self + TMS)
resulted to be significant (χ2 = 22.32; df = 2; n = 16; P < 0.001).
A post hoc Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed that the ratings in
self condition (mean, 3.87 ± 1.49) were significantly lower than
in other (mean, 4.60 ± 1.39; z = 3.52; P < 0.001; r = −0.62) and in
self + TMS (mean, 4.36 ± 1.55; z = 3.15; P = 0.002; r = −0.55), while
the ratings in self + TMS were not significantly different from
other (z = 1.91; P = 0.06); see Figure 3A. These results show that
participants displayed typical SA effect, and TMS over the SMA
disrupted this effect.
RHI + SA paradigm
With respect to the perceived intensity of the somatosensory
electrical stimulus delivered to the participant’s right hand, a
Friedman’s test comparing intensities in the embodiment con-
dition with those in the SA paradigm (self and other) resulted
to be significant (χ2 = 18.32; df = 2; n = 16; P < 0.001). Post
hoc Wilcoxon signed-rank tests showed that in embodiment
(mean, 3.62 ± 1.60) condition, the perceived intensity was sig-
nificantly lower than in other condition (z = 2.90; P = 0.004;
r = −0.51) and did not differ from self condition (z = 0.93; P = 0.11).
This result shows that when the embodied fake hand produces
somatosensory electrical stimuli, its intensity is attenuated as
the intensity of self-produced stimuli.
Furthermore,when the TMSwas applied over the SMA before
the onset of the fake hand’s movement, according to a paired
sample t-test, stimuli intensity ratings were significantly lower
in embodiment condition compared to embodiment + TMS con-
Fig. 2. Results of RHI paradigm: 2A, mean proprioceptive drift in synchronous and asynchronous condition; 2B, mean ratings in real and control statements of the
ownership questionnaire in synchronous and asynchronous condition. Error bars represent standard error of means; ∗, significant.
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Fig. 3. Results of SA and RHI + SA paradigm (mean ratings of the somatosensory electrical stimuli intensity): 3A, mean intensity ratings in self, other and self + TMS
conditions; 3B,mean intensity ratings in embodiment condition compared to embodiment+ TMS condition. Error bars represent standard error ofmeans; ∗, significant.
dition (mean, 3.81 ± 1.63; t = −2.49; df = 15; P = 0.025; dz = 0.12);
see Figure 3B. Therefore, TMS over the SMA decreased SA of
the stimuli produced by the embodied fake hand, similar to the
condition of self-generated stimulation.
As regards subjective agency ratings, 2 × 2 repeated-
measures Analysis of variance (ANOVA) for condition (embodi-
ment, embodiment + TMS) × type (real, control) as within-subject
factors did not showany significant differences (f = 0.49,P = 0.50).
This shows that participants did not experience strong agency
over the movements of the embodied fake hand, although there
was a trend for it—the scores in real questions were positive
in both conditions (mean, 0.14 ± 1.6 in embodiment condition
and 0.20 ± 1.85 in embodiment + TMS condition). Additionally,
TMS over the SMA did not affect the subjective sense of agency,
since the ratings in real questions were not different between
conditions (see Figure 3D).
As regards subjective ownership ratings, Wilcoxon signed-
rank test showed that, in embodiment condition, the ratings
in real statements (mean, 2.49 ± 0.70) were significantly higher
than in control statements (mean,−0.17± 1.96; z = 3.41; P = 0.001;
r = 0.60). Similarly, in embodiment + TMS condition, the rat-
ings in real statements (mean, 2.36 ± 0.77) were significantly
higher than in control statements (mean, −0.18 ± 2.01; z = 3.46;
P < 0.001; r = 0.61). On the contrary, the ratings in real (z = 0.12;
P = 0.41) or control (z = 3.41; P = 0.91) statements were not
different between conditions (see Figure 3C). This shows that the
TMS pulse over SMA did not affect embodiment.
Discussion
Here we tested whether body-related signals subserving body
ownership act upon agency attribution as motor-related signals
are known to do. We compared attenuation of somatosensory
stimuli generated by the movements of one’s own hand, a fake
hand and an embodied fake hand with or without TMS applied
over the SMA.
Firstly, in the baseline condition, that is when body owner-
ship (RHI) was evaluated separately from SA, our sample pre-
sented the typical RHI effects (i.e. the fake hand was embod-
ied at both implicit and explicit levels when stimulated syn-
chronously with the participant’s own hand). These results are
in line with previous literature pinpointing the importance of
spatiotemporal integration of incoming sensory signals in the
experience of the body as one’s own (Botvinick and Cohen,
1998; Ehrsson et al., 2005; Holmes and Spence, 2005; Tsakiris
and Haggard, 2005; Costantini and Haggard, 2007; Longo et al.,
2008; Petkova et al., 2011; Burin et al., 2017b; Burin et al., 2017c;
Pyasik et al., 2018). Furthermore, participants displayed the SA
effect (i.e. the perceived intensity of self-produced somatosen-
sory electrical stimuli resulted to be reduced with respect to
the intensity of the same stimuli generated externally). These
findings are consistent with previous data (Blakemore et al.,
1998; Bays et al., 2005; Voss et al., 2006; Voss et al., 2008; Stenner
et al., 2014; Timm et al., 2014) and further support the idea that
SA is a key component of experiencing authorship over willed
actions.
Secondly, when RHI and SA were combined within the same
setup and the embodied fake hand delivered the stimuli, atten-
uation was also present and comparable with the one observed
in the SA paradigm. These findings are consistent with those
obtained in two previous behavioral studies (Burin et al., 2018;
Burin et al., 2017c). In those studies, SA and subjective experience
of agency were measured in three different conditions: over
the movements of one’s own hand, an embodied fake hand
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(synchronous stimulation) or a non-embodied fake hand (no
stimulation/asynchronous stimulation/synchronous stimula-
tion of incongruently located fake hand) when they pressed
a button delivering a stimulus to the participant’s body. As in
the present study, the stimulus intensity was attenuated when
one’s own or the embodied fake hand delivered the stimulus but
not when the non-embodied fake hand delivered the stimulus
(which, in turn, meant that attenuation was not related to
the kind of stimulation—synchronous or asynchronous—but
rather to ownership per se). Considering these findings, here
we administered the only condition that evoked ownership,
i.e. synchronous stimulation with congruent location of the
fake hand. However, contrary to those studies, here we did
not find that movements of the embodied fake hand were
also subjectively attributed to one’s own will (explicit sense
of agency), although there was a trend for it, i.e. the ratings
in the questionnaire statements that described the feeling of
agency were positive. Hence, one might argue that, in this
case, SA alone might reflect some process unrelated to the
sense of agency. Despite some authors agreed with this view
(Hughes et al., 2012; Dewey and Knoblich, 2014; Weller et al.,
2017), the majority of the existing literature pinpoints the idea
that a necessary condition of SA is the presence of the signals
related to the preparation of a voluntary action (Voss et al., 2006,
2008; Timm et al., 2014), even in the absence of a subjective
explicit representation of sense of agency (e.g. Borhani et al.,
2017).
Another key point to emphasize is that our setup allowed
eliminating any actual or even potential efferent signals. Indeed,
participants neither performed nor intended any movements,
and the use of a quick, one-shot movement achieved by the fake
hand’s finger prevented even priming such signals. On the con-
trary, with the exception of Burin et al. (2017c), previous above-
mentioned experiments entailed, in one way or another, at least
some efferent signals: actual (Banakou and Slater, 2014; Kilteni
and Ehrsson, 2017)/primed (Kokkinara et al., 2016) movements
or actual motor intentions (Garbarini et al., 2013, 2015). This, in
turn, suggests that those studies cannot provide unequivocal
evidence of the role of body ownership per se in the experience
of voluntary actions. In other words, the present setup, clearly
allows one to provide evidence of the role of body ownership
in the subjective awareness of voluntary actions independently
from any kind of motor-related signals.
Thirdly, and most importantly, single-pulse TMS over
the SMA disrupted somatosensory attenuation, regardless of
whether the stimuli were generated by one’s own movement or
the movement of the embodied fake hand. Hence, we confirmed
that TMS over the SMA eliminates SA of self-generated stimuli
(Haggard and Whitford, 2004). Crucially, here we also showed
that the SA driven by body-related signals (i.e. the embodiment
of the fake hand) was affected similarly to the SA triggered
by motor-related signals (i.e. one’s own intended movements),
which might suggest that they share at least some neural
signatures. In order to exclude the possibility that our results
might be related to a non-specific stimulation effect, rather
than to the interference with the target area, we added a control
TMS condition. We recruited a different group of participants
and performed the SA baseline paradigm (i.e. the comparison
between the subjective intensity of self-generated and other-
generated somatosensory stimuli) with the single-pulse TMS
over the vertex. The results showed that the TMS over the vertex
did not modulate the SA, thus confirming that the results of the
main experiment are related to the interference with the brain
area involved in motor intention and SA.
In summary, by demonstrating the same TMS-driven pat-
tern when somatosensory stimuli were generated by one’s own
action and by the movement of the embodied fake hand, we
showed that body-related signals act upon the SA as motor-
related signals do and that these two processes depend, at least
in part, on the activity of the same neural structures. Inter-
estingly, the sense of body ownership was not affected by the
interference with the SMA activity, suggesting that while agency
ismodulated by ownership, ownership is not affected by changes
in agency (‘when a hand is mine, it remains mine even when
I do not recognize the agency of the action’). We suggest that
future studies should try explaining how the complex interplay
among the variety of afferent and efferent signals contributes to
the construction of a full and coherent motor consciousness.
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Supplementary data are available at SCAN online.
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